2012 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

3-20-2012

USA v. Kyle Ishmael

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012

Recommended Citation
"USA v. Kyle Ishmael" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 1265.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/1265

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
No. 11-1994
__________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
KYLE MICHAEL ISHMAEL,
Appellant
__________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 1-09-cr-00388-006 )
District Judge: The Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
January 10, 2012
BEFORE: FUENTES, JORDAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Filed: March 20, 2012 )
__________
OPINION OF THE COURT
__________
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge
Kyle Michael Ishmael appeals the sentence imposed by the District Court after he
pleaded guilty to distributing five or more grams of cocaine base, in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Ishmael contends that the District Court erred by denying him a
safety valve reduction.
1.

As we write only for the parties, we briefly relate the facts underlying this appeal.
On December 2, 2009, a grand jury issued a two-count indictment charging Ishmael and
eight other individuals with distribution and conspiracy to distribute 50 grams of cocaine
base in York County, Pennsylvania. Ishmael pleaded guilty to a superseding information
that charged him with distribution of five grams or more of cocaine base.
Ishmael asked the District Court to sentence him without regard for the five-year
statutory minimum sentence pursuant to the “safety valve” provisions of 18 U.S.C. §
3553(f). The District Court declined, finding Ishmael ineligible for relief because he
failed to provide completely truthful information. Ishmael has appealed the District
Court’s refusal to apply the safety valve reductions. We will affirm.
2.
The safety valve provision “establish[es] that a defendant shall be sentenced
pursuant to the sentencing guidelines without regard to any statutory minimum sentence
in certain drug offense cases in the event that . . . five conditions are met.” United States
v. Sabir, 117 F.3d 750, 751 (3d Cir. 1997). These conditions are:

1.
2.

the defendant does not have more than 1 criminal
history point, as determined under the Guidelines;
the defendant did not use violence or credible threats
of violence or possess a firearm or other dangerous
2

3.
4.

5.

weapon (or induce another participant to do so) in
connection with the offense;
the offense did not result in death or serious bodily
injury to any person;
the defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager,
or supervisor of others in the offense, as determined
under the Sentencing Guidelines and was not engaged
in a continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in [21
U.S.C. § 848]; and,
not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the
defendant has truthfully provided to the Government
all information and evidence the defendant has
concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the
same course of conduct or of a common scheme or
place, but the fact that the defendant has no relevant or
useful other information to provide or that the
Government is already aware of the information shall
not preclude a determination by the court that the
defendant has complied with this request.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).
This provision provides relief to individuals who played minor roles in drug
trafficking conspiracies, and who lacked the detailed knowledge to qualify for
“substantial assistance” sentence reductions under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). Such defendants
bear the burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the safety
valve provisions are applicable in his or her case. Sabir, 117 F.3d at 754. The
application of these provisions “not only requires a defendant to admit the conduct
charged, but [] also imposes an affirmative obligation on the defendant to volunteer any
information aside from the conduct comprising the elements of the offense.” United
States v. O’Dell, 247 F.3d 655, 675 (6th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). The safety valve provision, unlike others in the Guidelines, requires the
defendants to reveal a broad scope of information about the relevant criminal conduct to
3

the authorities. See Sabir, 117 F.3d at 753. “These stringent requirements reflect the fact
that the safety valve was intended to benefit only those defendants who truly cooperate.”
O’Dell, 247 F.3d at 675 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s refusal to apply the safety
valve provision. United States v. Wilson, 106 F.3d 1140, 1143 (3d Cir. 1997). We can
reject the District Court’s factual finding that Ishmael did not provide the required
information and evidence only if we conclude that those findings were clearly erroneous.
Sabir, 117 F.3d at 752.
3.
Here, there is no dispute that Ishmael met the first four factors. At issue in this
appeal is whether he satisfied the fifth factor by truthfully providing the Government with
all the evidence he possessed “concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the
same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5). The
Government maintains that the District Court correctly determined that Ishmael did not
fulfill his affirmative obligation and burden to demonstrate that he was completely candid
in disclosing all information regarding his role or the role of his co-conspirators in the
drug trafficking offense. Ishmael maintains he did disclose all relevant information at
sentencing.
The record reveals more than sufficient evidence to support the District Court’s
conclusion that Ishmael failed to completely disclose all his knowledge of the offense.
Indeed, Ishmael’s own testimony thwarted his request for a safety valve reduction. His
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failure to provide candid, verifiable information precluded the District Court’s
application of the reduction. As the District Court noted:
Notably, [Ishmael] claimed in his proffer and in his testimony
that he sold crack cocaine to approximately fifteen
individuals. These individuals would contact Defendant via
telephone when they wanted a delivery of crack cocaine.
Defendant testified that he knew these individuals because he
previously sold marijuana to them. When questioned about
their identities, Defendant could only recall three first names
and an apparent nickname. Defendant was unable to provide
any other identification or information regarding these
individuals. Defendant was not aware whether these
individuals were identified with any particular group or gang.
Defendant had no recollection as to where these sales would
occur, stating only that they would occur wherever [his
customers] would call him to.
The court finds it incredible that [Ishmael] could not recall
any further information regarding these individuals and is
somewhat confounded by his explanation or his inability to
do so . . . . That [Ishmael] cannot remember any other
information about these individuals and is unable to recall any
location where he met them strikes the court as disingenuous
and supports a finding the Defendant has not met his burden
of showing full and complete truthfulness of the sort
contemplated by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). Thus, on this point
alone, the court would deny the application of the safety
valve.
We can see no error in the District Court’s determination that Ishmael’s testimony
was not credible. Ishmael bore the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the
evidence that he had been candid with investigators and had volunteered “all
information” he had relating to his trafficking activities. See Sabir, 117 F.3d at 754. The
District Court’s determination that he did not meet this burden because he withheld
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information he would reasonably be expected to know was not an erroneous finding.
This was not an erroneous finding.
4.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court's judgment of
sentence.
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